Adaptation Nation: Three Pivotal Transitions in American Law & Society Since 1886 by Cuéllar, Mariano-Florentino
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 70 Number 2 
2018 
Adaptation Nation: Three Pivotal Transitions in American Law & 
Society Since 1886 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal History 
Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Adaptation Nation: Three Pivotal Transitions in American Law & Society Since 
1886, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 321 (2018), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
 
321 
OKLAHOMA 
LAW REVIEW 
 VOLUME 700000000000000000WINTER 20180000000000000000NUMBER 2 
 
ADAPTATION NATION: THREE PIVOTAL 
TRANSITIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 
& SOCIETY SINCE 1886 
MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUÉLLAR
*
 
Political competition, demography and migration, and evolving 
technologies all but guarantee that countries from every region experience 
constant change—both within the societies they encompass and in relation 
to the world beyond their borders. As countries adapt to these changes or 
seek to resist them, they face recurring dilemmas about the legitimacy and 
capacity of domestic institutions meant to resolve societal disputes, the role 
of immigrants in their society, and the social and economic tradeoffs 
triggered by technological innovation. In the United States, our responses to 
these dilemmas have come with major consequences for the country's 
history, its legal system, and its place in the world.  
What follows is an effort to explore three major transitions associated 
with these dilemmas in the United States since approximately 1886, the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Justice, Supreme Court of California; former Stanley Morrison Professor, Stanford 
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date of the Haymarket Square riot in Chicago. First, between roughly the 
last decade of the nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth 
century, the United States made great strides in the use and capacity of its 
institutions. At the outset, the United States could be reasonably described 
as a developing country constrained by labor conflicts explosive enough to 
spark incidents such as the Haymarket Square riot, fragile institutions, and 
economic uncertainty. By the end of this period the United States was a 
preeminent global power making routine use of courts and agencies to 
resolve societal disputes. Second, in the latter half of the twentieth century 
and the early twenty-first century, Americans saw their country experience 
major demographic changes arising from the United States' distinctive 
approach to immigration. And third, the United States now faces emerging 
legal and governance challenges as technological developments involving 
networked computers and so-called “artificial intelligence” affect society 
and the nature of work.  
My purpose here is to describe these transitions, along with some of their 
lesser-known legal implications and interrelationships. I reflect on some of 
their similarities and differences and place them in the context of related 
legal developments. By considering how law and society have affected each 
other during these transitions, we can better appreciate the choices 
advanced industrialized countries face as they adapt to a world replete with 
new risks and opportunities. More specifically, we can learn much about 
how the United States’ historical legacies and arrangements for pluralist 
governance affected its own distinctive process of adaptation.  
In exploring these three particular transitions, my claim is not that these 
are the only changes that mattered to American law or society over the last 
120 years, or that Americans have fashioned optimal responses in these 
domains—indeed, the process of even defining what “optimal” means in 
the context of these transitions continues still today. Nor are these 
transitions unique to the United States, either in terms of the forces shaping 
the law or the specific responses that arose to those forces. But in their own 
ways, all of these transitions prove revealing of the United States’ 
distinctive strengths, preoccupations, and challenges.  
No serious account of American society, law, or institutions, for 
example, can ignore the prominent role Americans assign to litigation and 
administrative agencies in resolving conflict. Nor does American economic 
or political history make sense without understanding the waves of 
immigrants that arrived on American shores during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, or the institutional framework for technological 
innovation the United States funded in earnest during the Cold War and 
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developed into a sophisticated computing infrastructure that proliferated 
around the world in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. What 
we gain by understanding these transitions is not only indispensable context 
for the United States’ early twenty-first century institutional dilemmas, but 
also an appreciation of how a pivotal geopolitical power forged—however 
imperfectly—legal arrangements incorporating norms of non-arbitrariness 
in different settings where law affects development. 
I. Channeling Conflict Through Institutions 
Imagine a child growing up in the heartland of the United States in 1928. 
His or her world was replete with contradictions. America was a vast 
country that had survived a civil war and more than a century and a half of 
history to become a massive, international creditor.
1
 But across the 
heartland, many Americans were living in poverty.
2
 The country’s leaders 
were divided about our role in the world.
3
 And storm clouds of economic 
and security crises loomed on the horizon. By 1933, the unemployment rate 
would rise from 4.4% to almost a quarter of the labor force, and net 
personal income would plummet from $79.8 billion to $47.2 billion.
4
 
Across the Atlantic, a secret analysis from the British Foreign Office 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Between 1923 and 1930, European countries signed over $22.2 billion in war debt 
agreements with the United States. ADAM TOOZE, THE DELUGE: THE GREAT WAR AND THE 
REMAKING OF THE GLOBAL ORDER, 1916-31, at 467 (Allen Lane 2014). 
 2. The United States government did not publish an official poverty rate until 1959, 
but some researchers estimate the poverty rate to be roughly sixty percent in 1929. See, e.g., 
JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA: A HANDBOOK 82 (3d ed. 2013) (showing poverty rates 
in the United States from 1929 to 2010). For more statistics illustrating the economic 
struggle of many Americans in the late 1920s, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 165 (1960), https://www2. 
census.gov/library/publications/1960/compendia/hist_stats_colonial-1957/hist_stats_colonial 
-1957.pdf (showing that 67.2% of American families had an income of less than $3000 in 
1929 (calculated as 1950 dollars)); Lee J. Alston, Farm Foreclosures in the United States 
During the Interwar Period, 43 J. ECON. HIST. 885, 888 (1983) (finding that farm 
foreclosures averaged 17.6 per thousand farms in 1928, whereas the farm foreclosure rate 
averaged 3.2 per thousand in the time periods from 1913–1920 and 1941–1950). 
 3. RONALD E. POWASKI, TOWARD AN ENTANGLING ALLIANCE: AMERICAN 
ISOLATIONISM, INTERNATIONALISM, AND EUROPE, 1901-1950, at 28–29 (1991) (describing 
how the United States expanded its role in world affairs during the 1920s while different 
American administrations simultaneously sought to avoid political entanglements with 
European nations); Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., The Anatomy of American “Isolationism” and 
Expansionism. Part 1, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 111, 122–24 (1958) (describing the Harding, 
Coolidge, and Hoover administrations’ foreign involvement from 1920 through 1932). 
 4. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, at 73, 139 (comparing 1928 to 1933). 
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written in November of that year captured the growing importance of 
America as it wrestled with domestic challenges and its role in the world. 
“Great Britain is faced in the United States of America with a 
phenomenon for which there is no parallel in our modern 
history—a state twenty-five times as large [as Britain], five 
times as wealthy, three times as populous, twice as ambitious, 
almost invulnerable, and at least our equal in prosperity, vital 
energy, technical equipment, and industrial science. This state 
has risen to its present state of development at a time when Great 
Britain is still staggering from the effects of the superhuman 
effort made during the [First World War], is loaded with a great 
burden of debt, and is crippled by the evil of unemployment.” 
However frustrating it might be to search for cooperation with 
the United States, the conclusion could not be avoided: “in 
almost every field, the advantages to be derived from mutual co-
operation are greater for us than for them.”5 
People say the British are prone to understatement, but there was none 
here. The memo is interesting because it emerged at roughly the midpoint 
of a remarkable transition the United States was experiencing, from relative 
international weakness and domestic instability to preeminent geostrategic 
power with relatively reliable institutions and domestic quiescence, 
particularly on labor and economic issues. Recall that the United States in 
the years between 1890 and the 1930s struggled with problems that bedevil 
many developing countries. Life in America during the first half of the 
twentieth century involved a mix of security, prosperity, instability, and 
violence.
6
 The Jim Crow regime in the South—backed by formal violence 
from the state and informal violence from groups such as the Ku Klux 
Klan—maintained African-Americans in a state of quasi-servitude.7 
                                                                                                                 
 5. TOOZE, supra note 1, at 463–64 (quoting Documents on British Foreign Policy, 
1919-1939, series 1a, col. 5, ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butter (London, 1973), 857-75; 
B. MCKERCHER, THE SECOND BALDWIN GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES, 1924-1929: 
ATTITUDES AND DIPLOMACY 174 (Cambridge 1984). 
 6. See, e.g., Peter Turchin, Dynamics of Political Instability in the United States, 1780-
2010, 49 J. PEACE RES. 577, 584 (2012) (showing a peak in political instability in the late 
1910s, using a database of instability events compiled from previous researchers and 
electronic media archives). 
 7. Legally sanctioned segregation, violence, and disenfranchisement in the South 
persisted well into the twentieth century. See GRETA DE JONG, A DIFFERENT DAY: AFRICAN 
AMERICAN STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE IN RURAL LOUISIANA, 1900–1970, at 116-43 (2002) 
(describing persistent segregation and discrimination in Louisiana during and after World 
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Meanwhile, labor-related riots and violent strikes were the stuff of daily 
life.
8
 In 1886, the Haymarket Square bombing in Chicago began as a 
peaceful demonstration of workers, but exploding dynamite and a haze of 
bullets turned it deadly.
9
 The exploding dynamite was an apt metaphor for 
the labor-related tensions that played out in the ensuing decades. The 
Chicago clothing workers’ strike in 1910 mobilized 41,000 workers,10 and 
the coal miners’ strikes in 1913 and 1914 led to the shooting of strikers and, 
in Ludlow, Colorado, the deaths of eleven children who were suffocated or 
burned.
11
 In 1922, after negotiations failed to deliver higher wages, 600,000 
mine workers went on strike.
12
 In June of that year, a company guard 
allegedly shot a striker in Herrin, Illinois, leading to violence and 
explosions at the mine headquarters.
13
 Across a variety of divisions, people 
did not necessarily expect major disputes about key issues like labor to be 
resolved in courtrooms and administrative agencies.  
                                                                                                                 
War II); Grace Elizabeth Hale, “For Colored” and “For White”: Segregating Consumption 
in the South, in JUMPIN’ JIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS FROM CIVIL WAR TO CIVIL RIGHTS 
162, 173–78 (Jane Dailey et al. eds., 2000) (describing Jim Crow laws throughout the south 
as captured by Farm Security Administration photographs); NEIL R. MCMILLEN, DARK 
JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 3-32 (1989) (describing Jim Crow 
laws and disenfranchisement in Mississippi from 1890 to 1940); Bryant Simon, Race 
Reactions: African American Organizing, Liberalism, and White Working-Class Politics in 
Postwar South Carolina, in JUMPIN’ JIM CROW: SOUTHERN POLITICS FROM CIVIL WAR TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS, supra, at 239, 239–55 (describing the legally-backed segregation, violence, 
and disenfranchisement that persisted in South Carolina through the 1930s and 1940s). 
Lynching increased dramatically in both frequency and intensity after the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, peaking from the 1890s through the first decade of the twentieth century. 
AMY LOUISE WOOD, LYNCHING AND SPECTACLE: WITNESSING RACIAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, 
1890–1940, at 3 (2009). Although determining the exact number of lynchings is difficult, 
one researcher estimates that white mobs in the South killed at least 3200 black men 
between 1880 and 1940. Id. For United States government records of lynchings during this 
time period, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 2, at 216.  
 8. Melvyn Dubofsky, Labor Unrest in the United States, 1906-90, 18 REV.: FERNAND 
BRAUDEL CTR. 125, 126 (1995) (describing labor unrest in the early twentieth century, with 
the highest recorded level of strikes in 1917 and continued labor unrest in the 1930s); 
Turchin, supra note 6, at 585 fig.5 (showing a peak in political violence, particularly in riots 
and lynchings, around 1920). 
 9. LABOR CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 166–68 (Ronald L. 
Filippelli ed., 1990). 
 10. Id. at 98–100. 
 11. Id. at 297–300. 
 12. Id. at 232–34. 
 13. Id. 
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By the time American soldiers entered World War II, a different picture 
had emerged. Labor-related riots and mass demonstrations were quite 
rare.
14
 Scholars measuring labor-related violence document a stark drop in 
such unrest between 1910 and 1940.
15
 Measuring corruption is more 
difficult, but analyses based on media coverage and qualitative accounts 
converge in suggesting that crass corruption became substantially less 
common between 1900 and the mid-1930s—by one measure there was a 
drop of about eighty percent during that time.
16
 
It is tempting to think that as societies become wealthier and institutions 
become more familiar, their norms and legal arrangements simply mature to 
a different stage of development.
17
 But as the stories of countries ranging 
from Brazil to Thailand indicate, there’s little to support that idea.18 Instead, 
we might tell a more nuanced story—one that I suspect goes something like 
this.  
                                                                                                                 
 14. Turchin, supra note 6, at 585 fig.5 (showing an average of approximately fifteen 
riots per five years in the 1940s, compared to a peak of roughly eighty riots per five years in 
the 1920s). 
 15. Dubofsky, supra note 8, at 131 fig.1 (showing steep decline in the early 1940s in the 
three-year moving average of labor unrest, based on mentions in newspaper database). 
 16. Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin, Introduction to CORRUPTION AND REFORM: 
LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 3, 15 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin 
eds., 2006) (demonstrating a roughly eighty percent decline in explicit corruption, calculated 
on the basis of newspaper coverage, between 1890 and 1930). 
 17. See generally WALT M. ROSTOW, POLITICS AND THE STAGES OF GROWTH (1971). 
 18. Brazil, for example, experienced significant economic growth and democratization 
after the end of military rule in 1985. Yet recently, this “supposed . . . vanguard of fast-
growing emerging economies . . . faces political dysfunction and perhaps a return to rampant 
inflation.” Brazil’s Fall: Disaster Looms for Latin America’s Biggest Economy, ECONOMIST 
(Jan. 2, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21684779-disaster-looms-latin-
americas-biggest-economy-brazils-fall. 
Similarly, Thailand experienced rapid economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, as its 
growth rate almost doubled between 1987 and 1995. INT’L MONETARY FUND, IMF STAFF 
COUNTRY REPORT NO. 00/21, THAILAND: SELECTED ISSUES 2 (2000), https://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/scr/2000/cr0021.pdf. But this rapid growth, due in part to over-investment 
after regulatory and economic policy reforms in the 1980s, threatened the sustainability of 
Thailand’s economy. Id. Unsustainable growth given the country’s actual institutional 
conditions, coupled with Thailand’s financial crisis in 1997, led to an estimated seventy 
percent cumulated fall in gross investment between 1996 and 1998. Id. at 7. Since 1997, the 
government has passed significant reforms to tax administration and the welfare state. 
Tomas Larsson, The Strong and the Weak: Ups and Downs of State Capacity in Southeast 
Asia, 5 ASIAN POL. & POL’Y 337, 345–46 (2013); see also id. at 351 (observing “that Thai 
legal-administrative state capacity has been transformed in tandem with the county’s 
economic and industrial structures”). 
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One reasonable way to begin understanding the United States’ 
remarkable transformation between roughly 1890 and 1950 is to first look 
to changes in the prevalence of crass corruption—the kind involving bags 
of cash paid to a judge in a county courthouse or a public official in a 
government agency. Such corruption was no small part of American life, 
but it appears to have begun a steady decline in most parts of the legal 
system sometime between the time of the Haymarket Square bombing in 
1886 and the 1930s.
19
 Scholars continue to debate the extent to which the 
declines reflected changes in politics, law enforcement, or culture.
20
 The 
media-enabled backlash of the American Progressive Era in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries almost certainly made it more 
difficult to ignore this kind of corruption.
21
 Spurred in part by public 
concern over sprawling conglomerates and in part by distrust of big-city 
political machines, that backlash was felt strongly in California, for 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Glaeser & Goldin, supra note 16, at 15 (estimating a roughly eighty percent decline 
in explicit corruption, calculated on the basis of a metric leveraging newspaper coverage, 
between 1890 and 1930). 
 20. For a discussion of the literature on the relationship between corruption, poor 
government, and growth, see id. at 18 (describing three major theories of reform, looking at 
the roles of institutions, certain producers, and political entrepreneurs in shaping reform 
against corruption), and Rebecca Menes, Limiting the Reach of the Grabbing Hand: Graft 
and Growth in American Cities, 1880 to 1930, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM 
AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY, supra note 16, at 63, 69–73 (discussing academic literature 
on the relationship between corruption, poor government, and growth). The rise and fall of 
corruption, for instance, roughly follows the rise and fall of political machines. Id. at 85–89. 
In addition, the decline of corruption corresponded with the rise of the independent press, as 
newspapers became demonstrably less connected to political parties. Matthew Gentzkow et 
al., The Rise of the Fourth Estate: How Newspapers Became Informative and Why It 
Mattered, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY, 
supra note 16, at 187, 190–91. In the same period, American cities competed with each other 
to attract businesses by adopting good government and pro-growth policies. Menes, supra, at 
70. 
 21. “The decades from the 1890s into the 1920s produced reform movements . . . that 
resulted in significant changes to the country’s social, political, cultural, and economic 
institutions." Maureen A. Flanagan, Progressives and Progressivism in an Era of Reform, 
OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA: AM. HISTORY, 1 (Aug. 2016), http://americanhistory.oxfordre. 
com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-84?print= 
pdf. Many political progressives attacked patronage politics and advocated for a shift to a 
merit-based civil service. Id. at 7. Other progressive initiatives aimed to limit the power of 
political parties. Governor Robert La Follette’s “Wisconsin Idea,” for example, exemplified 
these efforts by instituting reforms in Wisconsin that replaced party control of nominations 
with a popular direct primary and gave voters the power to hold referenda on proposed 
legislation. Id. 
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example. In the Golden State, anxiety over the political power of the 
railroads led to a state constitutional provision in force to this day providing 
that any public official accepting free transportation forfeits his or her 
office.
22
  
Federalism was also likely important in changing norms about crass 
corruption. Both state-level and federal authorities can enforce laws against 
corruption, and federal officials may have different strengths and priorities 
in pursuing corruption compared to state officials. Implicit in robust 
federalism is sufficient institutional independence to make possible a 
degree of competition between sovereigns. Federal officials can do more 
than critique—they can investigate and prosecute state-level corruption. 
Conversely, state officials can offer alternatives to federal investigation and 
prosecution, and indeed, the careers of some law enforcement officials 
reflect involvement in anti-corruption enforcement in both systems.
23
 
More fundamentally, the distribution of land and wealth in the United 
States was also markedly different than in other developing countries. In 
contrast to the pattern observed in countries like Argentina and Mexico that 
emerged from the Spanish colonial empire, land distribution and control in 
many parts of the United States was dispersed enough to facilitate the rise 
of a relatively large merchant and artisan middle class wary of corruption.
24
 
Of course, crass corruption of the kind involving outright deal making to 
sell official power never disappeared entirely in the United States. All too 
many examples still arise—for instance, in this decade, a Pennsylvania 
judge was convicted of colluding with a private prison company to fill more 
                                                                                                                 
 22. CAL. CONST. art. XII, § 7; id. art. XII, § 19 (repealed 1974); JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET 
AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION 15–16 (2d ed. 2016) (describing growth and 
consolidation of railroads in California under the Central Pacific Railroad, which by the late 
1870s controlled over eighty-five percent of the state’s rail line and was both the largest 
landowner and largest employer in the state). During the late 1990s, a legal opinion from the 
California Attorney General clarified that this provision does not extend to frequent flyer 
tickets earned through programs available to the general public. 80 Cal. Op. Att’y Gen. 146 
(1997) (finding that a public official does not forfeit an office under article XII, section 7 of 
the California Constitution if the officeholder exchanges frequent flyer miles for an airplane 
ticket). 
 23. Robert Morgenthau, for example, was the United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of New York before being fired by President Richard Nixon and becoming the 
Manhattan District Attorney. John Leland, Robert Morgenthau on His Years as District 
Attorney: ‘I Don’t Look Back,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/11/23/nyregion/robert-morgenthau-manhattan-district-attorney.html?_r=0. Morgenthau 
prioritized public corruption prosecutions in both roles. Id. 
 24. See generally DAVID ROCK, ARGENTINA, 1516-1987: FROM SPANISH COLONIZATION 
TO ALFONSÍN xxv-xxvi (1987). 
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beds by sending juveniles into detention.
25
 And to the extent norms 
changed, they undoubtedly did so more quickly in some areas of the 
country and institutions compared to others. Moreover, we can distinguish 
crass corruption from other practices where concentrated power gains 
advantage—sometimes through official channels, as through lobbying or 
campaign contributions. Offering a broader treatment of the concept of 
corruption would be a subtle enterprise requiring considerable taxonomic 
stamina. What is enough for present purposes is to emphasize that crass 
corruption among public officials is something the public can occasionally 
still witness, but in no small measure because such corruption is often 
detected and punished.  
Corruption weakens both public support for the capacity of public 
institutions and the ability of bureaucrats and judges to operate with 
integrity. Who would trust a court or government clerk who can be easily 
bought or sold? Without change in norms about the integrity of institutions, 
courts and agencies could not have become more legitimate or powerful as 
institutions able to determine how much of a voice workers might have in a 
workplace, or whether certain dealings between companies violated 
antitrust law. Yet from changes in media coverage and case studies, it 
appears crass corruption gradually ebbed to the point that it could not be 
described as a nationally pervasive, routine practice. This at least opened 
the door to capacity building and adaptation that could not have happened 
otherwise. As a consequence, the United States headed into World War I—
and, eventually, into the period of intense economic dislocation of the 
1930s—with new laws arising from the Progressive Era and gradually 
changing norms about the propriety of blatant crass corruption such as 
holding unofficial auctions to see who can more handsomely pay off a 
judge or bureaucrat to deliver the desired result.  
 Just how greater institutional capacity came to matter in this period of 
American history becomes clearer when we turn our attention to labor. 
Labor disputes were central to American history in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as the United States strengthened the concept of 
national citizenship. As the American political theorist Judith Shklar puts it, 
in the United States, citizenship is as powerfully connected to the idea of 
work and the dignity that comes from it as it is to anything else. “The 
opportunity to work and to be paid an earned reward for one’s labor was a 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See Eyder Peralta, Pa. Judge Sentenced to 28 Years in Massive Juvenile Justice 
Bribery Scandal, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/ sections/thetwo-
way/2011/08/11/139536686/pa-judge-sentenced-to-28-years-in-massive-juvenile-justice-
bribery-scandal. 
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social right, because it was a primary source of public respect.”26 Yet as the 
participants in the Haymarket Square riots could certainly appreciate, the 
rise of unions made work not only a source of dignity and shared belonging 
but also a setting for intense disagreement.  
 Early agreements allowing government agencies to play a larger role in 
resolving such conflict depended on accommodation of the legal changes 
necessary to channel disputes into formal institutions. Rulings of the 
National Labor Relations Board, as well as decisions splitting institutional 
advantages between labor and business in light of the Wagner Act and the 
Taft-Hartley Act, were accepted by emerging union leaders, corporate 
managers, and the lawyers who represented each side. Yet by World War 
II, labor conflict had become largely a legal and administrative conflict. 
Indeed, by the early 1940s, courts were dealing with issues such as whether 
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board to certify collective 
bargaining units could be reviewed by the DC Circuit,
27
 and under what 
circumstances a union could challenge an employer’s decision not to 
bargain collectively with employee representatives.
28
 Meanwhile, social 
insurance, carefully crafted to survive the legislative process and legal 
constraints, promised to take the edge off some of the economic risk that 
could exacerbate labor conflict and damage internal cohesion. 
Important as it is to understand shifting strategies among business and 
labor leaders and social policies to mitigate economic risk, the channeling 
of labor-related conflicts depended on more than just a change in attitudes 
among the elite or the ameliorative promise of social insurance. Rather, the 
agencies into which conflicts were being channeled had to be capable of 
gathering information, adjudicating, issuing decisions, and crafting and 
implementing regulations. Without some degree of capacity, labor disputes 
cannot be meaningfully adjudicated, nor can wars be won. As labor conflict 
spread and threatened to cast a pall over prospects for the stability of public 
institutions, American society gradually entered into a series of 
compromises to build institutional capacity while imposing limits on how 
that capacity was controlled and used. As institutions became more reliable, 
and as elites at the time became more comfortable with the risks and 
benefits of channeling, disputes—and especially labor disputes—moved 
from the factory floor and the street to courts and administrative agencies.  
                                                                                                                 
 26. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1–2 (1991). 
 27. See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940). 
 28. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146 (1941). 
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But as institutions acquired greater capacity for resolving labor disputes, 
providing social insurance, collecting taxes on a massive scale, or fighting a 
war, it became more urgent to determine who controls them and how much 
power they have. Understanding these heightened stakes puts in perspective 
the importance not only of reducing crass corruption that could buy and sell 
decisions of courts and agencies, but also the United States Supreme 
Court’s separation of powers cases from the 1920s to the 1940s. To 
understand decisions in cases like Humphrey’s Executor,29 Schecter 
Poultry,
30
 and, eventually, the Steel Seizure cases,
31
 we must take account 
of both the immediate disagreements presented by the cases and the 
growing and more powerful machinery of state capacity that made control 
of the federal government a higher-stakes game. Though in some ways the 
majority opinions in these cases were doctrinally awkward, one might 
understand them as part of a compromise enabling a more powerful federal 
state, but with limits on executive power to control agencies, delegate 
agency power to the private sector, or justify the use of state coercive 
capacity—even on national security grounds—through executive actions 
lacking some statutory authority. 
It is surely true that some hostility to the New Deal agenda existed in the 
courts. Such antipathy was familiar among the societal networks from 
which many judges were drawn. What neither the simple hostility story nor 
the focus on the inter-branch politics of the so-called "switch in time that 
saved nine" fully captures are the nuances—including those playing out 
inside the Supreme Court. Justice Cardozo’s canny persuasive efforts, 
rather than responses to external political pressures, may have nudged 
Justices Hughes and Roberts to join in the majority in Nebbia v. New York, 
for example.
32
 Some adaptation in legal position and legislative design 
occurred on different sides, and government lawyers sometimes erred both 
in the selection of cases and their approach to advocacy—as when Assistant 
Attorney General Harold Stephens botched the government's position at 
oral arguments.
33
 As I describe in a piece called Securing the Nation, 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt faced steep political costs from the so-
called court packing plan, making it a less credible threat than some 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 30. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 32. See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 170 (1998). 
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scholars have suggested.
34
 And structurally the courts were navigating a 
time of expanding capacity in American national government that made 
somewhat more urgent questions of who controlled that capacity. 
Taking these nuances more seriously, we can see the New Deal-era court 
decisions challenging the Roosevelt administration as more than simply a 
rejection of certain New Deal policies. Instead, they can also be understood 
as an attempt to demarcate a space for policies that might generate only 
limited friction when reconciled with prevailing doctrine, and even the 
kinds of legal arguments that would help achieve at least some of the 
administration’s goals without creating quite as much risk to the emerging 
institutional equilibrium. The Jones & Laughlin Steel case in 1937 is often 
seen as pivotal, as it signaled the end of the Court’s tendency to strike down 
New Deal legislation and recognized the extent of congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause. As professor Barry Cushman points out, 
though, the Supreme Court had already recognized the ambiguity of the 
public/private distinction and expanded the scope of businesses that could 
be deemed to affect interstate commerce in Nebbia v. New York.
35
 Even as 
the court set structural limits on legislative and executive power, it also 
recognized that appropriate federal legislation could regulate workplace 
relations, since interstate commerce was affected and advocates had 
persuaded the court that liberty of contract was in conflict with workers’ 
freedom of association to join a union. 
This measure of partial continuity in doctrine—along with continuing 
judicial efforts to balance their doctrinal commitments with the practical 
challenges faced by an expanding federal government—fits with an 
argument Seth Waxman advanced at a Yale Law School lecture nearly two 
decades ago, though he used somewhat different language.
36
 True to his 
experience as a consummate advocate, Waxman reminds us to consider the 
technical changes in legal argument that almost certainly facilitated later 
victories of Justice Department lawyers defending legal arrangements 
reflecting expanded federal power.
37
 He also emphasized that the 
administration itself learned a thing or two, and managed to avoid the more 
provocative institutional arrangements delegating, for example, public 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, ‘Securing’ the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization 
at the Federal Security Agency, 1939-1953, Stanford Public Law Research Paper No. 
942447 (2006). 
 35. Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal Consciousness: The Current of Commerce 
Doctrine from Swift to Jones & Laughlin, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 130 (1992). 
 36. See Waxman, supra note 33. 
 37. Id. at 2400. 
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power almost directly into private hands.
38
 Hence, Yakus v. United States—
playing out a few years later against the backdrop of World War II—was 
not just a rerun of Schecter Poultry.
39
 Rather, price controls affecting 
business, labor, and consumers involved more limited authority, were 
subject to public oversight, and gave courts some basis for judicial review.
40
 
And the executive made the case for these in terms of America’s interests 
as a newly emerged geopolitical power.
41
 
The internal cohesion to which channeling of disputes contributes allows 
a country to develop greater capacity to respond to international crises. But 
those crises also test leaders and citizens in novel ways. President 
Roosevelt, on the eve of World War II, faced daunting challenges. The 
public was deeply divided and quite skeptical about foreign entanglements. 
The American army was the eighteenth-largest in the world in the spring of 
1940, just behind the Dutch army that had surrendered to the Nazis a short 
time before.
42
 The federal government had few, if any, agencies that 
operated with truly nationwide scope, and only about ten percent of the 
population paid any federal income taxes.
43
 How Roosevelt and his 
administration navigated the transition from New Deal to wartime footing is 
revealing. As previously mentioned, greater state capacity made separation 
of powers a much higher-stakes game, hence the importance of the norms 
that developed between the early New Deal and World War II. Upsetting 
those norms was never more possible than during the wartime apogee of 
presidential power. Roosevelt ally Clifford Durr, from his perch as FCC 
Chair, urged the president to treat the wartime period as a second bite at the 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Id. at 2402. 
 39. See id. at 2405-08 (describing legal developments post-Schechter Poultry). 
 40. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-24, 427 (1944) (describing the 
Emergency Price Control Act as a valid exercise of Congress’s legislative power in that 
“Congress has stated the legislative objection, has prescribed the method of achieving that 
objective . . . and has laid down standards to guide the administrative determination of both 
the exercise of the price-fixing power, and the particular prices to be established” and 
comparing the regime to legislative acts in a number of post-Schechter Poultry cases). 
 41. See id. at 426-27. 
 42. Arthur Herman, The FDR Lesson Obama Should Follow, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2012, 
at A15. 
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apple to reshape the American social compact further, as he’d sought to do 
with the National Industrial Recovery Act.
44
  
Such a path is not the one Roosevelt ultimately countenanced. Instead, he 
worked with an ideologically heterodox group of advisers including James 
Byrnes and the indispensable Harry Hopkins to forge a broad coalition of 
business and industry that also accommodated the interests of the military, 
agriculture, and consumers.
45
 Familiar features of today’s administrative 
state became commonplace: broad delegations of legislative power to 
agencies with nationwide scope, administrative subpoenas, mass federal 
taxation, and White House supervision of administrative agencies.
46
 Even 
more remarkable was what did not change: there was no move to 
nationalize industrial sectors or displace the private sector, price controls 
took account of political realities (particularly agricultural interests), and 
norms involving judicial review and pluralist accommodation in 
administrative decision-making took hold.
47
 
Roosevelt’s actions proved important because they helped the country 
navigate the legally complex and politically fraught thicket of mobilization. 
But even more fundamentally, the mix of wartime capacity building and 
restraint evinced by the administration mattered because it was part of a 
sequence. In fits and starts, leaders in labor, business, and government came 
to trust institutions enough to channel conflict through them. A sharp break 
with American norms would almost certainly have put at risk that trust. 
Rather, Roosevelt kept in place a kind of centrist compromise that respected 
certain unwritten but almost quasi-constitutional norms that came to 
constitute the core of the administrative state during World War II and 
remained the core of the administrative state through the Cold War and into 
                                                                                                                 
 44. At the time, Durr called for more dramatic and long-term reforms in the relationship 
between government and private industry: 
We have learned already that we cannot obtain the production we need for 
waging the war as an undirected by-product of what we commonly refer to as 
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with [these] objectives . . . than with the profits or losses of individual business 
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Clifford J. Durr, The Postwar Relationship Between Government and Business, 33 AM. 
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today. When societies are riven by riots, internal conflict, and instability, 
these forces do not dissipate by themselves because of something in the 
water or some unavoidable teleological progression. Even with favorable 
geography and the right international circumstances—and the strength of an 
extraordinary generation that found itself embroiled in the Depression and 
World War II—institutional progress is contingent and partially dependent 
on state capacity, which contributes to channeling that conflict.
48
 As state 
capacity grew during the World War II era, the country was able to avoid 
the problems of the interwar era—described as a period where the United 
States was largely unable to assert the kind of global leadership the period 
demanded.
49
 
The role the United States played in the decades after World War II, 
during the Cold War, provides the backdrop for a more recent episode of 
channeling contentious disputes into institutions: civil rights. Even after 
labor-related violence abated, intense episodes of violence associated with 
race persisted in the American South.
50
 It took the Civil Rights Movement 
of the 1960s to achieve the next major step, by eventually—through a 
combination of extensive social mobilization and legal change—helping to 
                                                                                                                 
 48. As institutions transform and state capacity increases, confidence in these 
institutions steadily increases. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: 
CONFLICT, SECURITY, AND DEVELOPMENT 103 (2011). The development community has 
recognized how this feedback loop drives a state from violence and fragility to institutional 
resilience and growth. Id. Accordingly, development agencies increasingly focus on building 
state capacity to channel conflict. In Afghanistan, for example, donors attempted to build 
state capacity by establishing more than 22,500 community development councils through 
the National Solidarity Program. Id. at 133. These local councils invested in critical 
infrastructure projects, increasing state capacity. Id. Research suggested these councils 
increased villagers’ trust in all levels of government. Id. For further discussion on how 
institutional progress and state capacity are linked, see generally ASHRAF GHANI & CLARE 
LOCKHART, FIXING FAILED STATES: A FRAMEWORK FOR REBUILDING A FRACTURED WORLD 
(2008); DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE ORIGINS OF 
POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY (2012). 
 49. See, e.g., TOOZE, supra note 1, at 515–16 (describing American impulse in the 
interwar period as “fundamentally, in its view of America itself, in its conception of what 
might be asked of America . . . profoundly conservative”). 
 50. See, e.g., 20th Bombing Here Against Negroes, BIRMINGHAM POST-HERALD (Sept. 
16, 1963), http://bplonline.cdmhost.com/digital/collection/p4017coll2/id/545. These attacks 
often targeted African Americans who moved into traditionally “white” neighborhoods, and 
African-American churches were frequently the target of such violence, particularly in the 
1950s and 1960s. See Mapping Violence Against African American Churches, STORYMAP, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.knightlab.com/storymapjs/0bf95573598f0b95125a529e5
91dbabf/black-church-bombings/index.html (last visited July 31, 2017) (documenting 
attacks on African American houses of worship in chronological order). 
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move disputes about equality and race into the more structured world of 
federal courts, state tribunals, and federal and state agencies like the EEOC. 
As with labor conflicts, the schisms over race in the United States spurred 
enormous upheaval, encompassing targeted organizing in the South and 
urban centers, mass protests, and violence that featured prominently on the 
new medium of television. The Cold War context loomed in the 
background, but so did the experience of channeling labor conflict largely 
into institutions, making it more plausible to marchers in Selma, Alabama, 
that legal changes could quench at least some of their thirst for justice. 
Throughout the process, federalism has been an important subtext because 
dual sovereignty creates both constraints—by engendering conflict between 
governments, for example—and competitive pressures. That legacy takes 
time to fully describe, but suffice to say that channeling involved a process 
of state and federal change that gave rise to new institutions and dilemmas. 
And some of the tensions of course persist.  
Such friction underscores the importance of how legal and societal 
changes affected a previous set of societal tensions. The institutional 
compromises forged in the early decades of the twentieth century allowed 
for the channeling of labor disputes into formal institutions and did much to 
distinguish America from other middle-income countries trying to build 
their institutions and economies. Without the channeling of labor conflicts 
or the Roosevelt administration’s observance of limits on government 
arbitrariness and control of industry, the United States would likely be a 
fundamentally different country.  
II. Picking the System for Picking Americans 
It was through another transition implicating matters of arbitrariness and 
the interplay of domestic and global concerns that the United States indeed 
became a fundamentally different country. During the decades preceding 
the New Deal, the United States transitioned from being a relatively high 
immigration country to one with only a trickle of legal immigrants, going 
from over 1.2 million new immigrants in 1907 to about 29,000 in 1934.
51
 
The Chinese Exclusion Act had been made permanent early in the century 
and was in full force.
52
 No program existed to resettle refugees,
53
 and even 
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when a small number of immigrants were permitted entry (as with the 
97,000 who arrived in 1931),
54
 effectively no path existed for legal 
immigration from the Western Hemisphere. Only with the stark pressures 
of World War II did the picture start to change. A small number of Jewish 
refugees began to arrive in America; a thirteen-year-old Judith Shklar, 
whose family had escaped Latvia through Norway and arrived in Seattle, 
was one of them.
55
 Belatedly, in 1944, the United States began structured 
efforts to resettle some refugees.
56
 And the so-called Bracero Program 
allowed for legal immigration to the United States by Mexican laborers 
who could take up the farm jobs that had been left vacant as soldiers left for 
the war and men and women filled factory jobs.
57
  
The Cold War and the economic and strategic scope of American 
interests changed the picture significantly. Even as American leaders came 
to accept that the country's global role and economic interests called for a 
different approach to migration, Americans passed the mid-century mark 
with a statutory framework that deliberately tied limited flows of legal 
immigrants to quotas reflecting the national origins of the American 
population in the 1920s.
58
 It took until 1965 for something closer to the 
existing system to emerge. That system was forged by President Lyndon B. 
Johnson and his allies in Congress like Representatives Emmanuel Hart of 
                                                                                                                 
55-61 (repealed 1943); see also Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), WWW.OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, 
https://ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=47 (last visited July 21, 2017). When 
the moratorium expired in 1892, Congress extended it for another ten years and then 
permanently under the Geary Act until 1943. Id. Under the Act, Chinese immigrants who 
had already entered the country could not receive citizenship and had to obtain certifications 
to re-enter. Id. 
 53. STUART ANDERSON, IMMIGRATION 152–55 (2010). 
 54. Table 1: Persons Obtaining Lawful Permanent Resident Status: Fiscal Years 1820 
to 2014, supra note 51. 
 55. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, ACLS OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 9, A LIFE OF LEARNING 1-2 
(1989), https://www.acls.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/OP/Haskins/1989_JudithNShklar. 
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annual meeting, Apr. 6, 1989). 
 56. FDR established the War Refugee Board in 1944 as an independent agency tasked 
with the rescue of refugees. United States Policy and Its Impact on European Jews, 
HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007 
652 (last visited Feb. 14, 2017). 
 57. The World War II-era Bracero agricultural program lasted from 1942 to 1947, with 
a peak of 62,000 workers in 1944. PHILIP L. MARTIN, PROMISE UNFULFILLED: UNIONS, 
IMMIGRATION AND THE FARM WORKERS 47 (2003). Between 1942 and 1964, some 4.6 
million Mexicans were admitted to do farm work. Id. 
 58. ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 11–12. 
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Massachusetts and Phil Celler of Michigan, many of whom had strong ties 
to urban political networks. At the time, the logic of broad immigration 
reform had at least three major components: (1) getting the United States 
away from a system with explicit racial classifications and low levels of 
permitted immigration, which painted the country in a negative light amidst 
Cold War competition; (2) expanding the country’s workforce with people 
who had either special ties to the country or special skills; and (3) 
addressing the concerns of political participants representing urban regions 
of the country with interests in expanded migration. 
At the core of America’s present mix of immigration policy 
compromises is the system forged in the mid-1960s. As modified by the 
1976 Western Hemisphere Act,
59
 the 1980 Refugee Act,
60
 and the 1990 
Immigration Act,
61
 the resulting system laid the foundation for America to 
return to higher levels of immigration
62—though even now, the percentage 
of the United States population that is foreign born is only 13.1%, 
compared to 14.7% in 1910.
63
 Instead of mechanically focusing on keeping 
national origins at a level from decades earlier, the new system had at its 
core two factors: country of origin, and whether a visa was sought for work 
or other reasons (such as family preference).
64
 Of course, choosing people 
to join American society is a task deeply reflective of our country's values 
and priorities, but it also reflects the twists and turns of our politics.  
Little did anyone suspect that the changes made to mollify Ohio 
Representative Michael Feighan would exert such a powerful effect on the 
United States. A tenacious adversary who controlled a subcommittee 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 
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13.1% in 2013, the most recent year of data from the U.S. Census Bureau); Slideshow: The 
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critical to the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 
(President Johnson’s proposed reform), Feighan insisted that the bill 
allocate the majority of legal immigrant visas to family-based immigrants 
as the price of his support.
65
 Feighan thought that allocating most visas to 
family-based immigrants would keep the composition of the country similar 
to what it had been.
66
 This turned out not to be the case, showcasing yet 
again how legal change implicates the complexity of a changing world. 
Demand to take up newly available visas was greater among some 
populations than others, in part because those who came through economic 
or refugee routes also had access to those visas. Since family-based 
immigration constituted a substantial majority of the visas in the revised 
bill, the United States has welcomed generations who forged strong ties—
often through family—to their new nation.  
Around that system, the country developed subtle ways of promoting a 
process for incorporating immigrants into the fabric of American society. In 
the United States, integration has often benefited from a feeling of certainty 
resulting from the relatively settled understanding of legal doctrine 
establishing and protecting the rights of immigrants, even unlawful ones.
67
 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See Gabriel J. Chin, Were the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 
Antiracist?, in THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1965: LEGISLATING A NEW 
AMERICA 11, 43, 45, 55 (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuison Villazor eds. 2015). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (deploying constitutional 
avoidance to interpret a statute as not permitting indefinite detention but rather limiting an 
alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that 
alien’s removal from the United States); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1986) 
(invalidating San Francisco ordinance that banned the laundries operated by Chinese 
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and which, in the eye of the law, is not justified”); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) 
(finding a Texas statute in violation of the Equal Protection clause where it withheld from 
school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not “legally admitted” 
into the United States and that authorized local school districts to deny enrollment to such 
children). This protection afforded immigrants contrasts with countries where the extension 
of rights to unlawful migrants is far less pronounced. Italy, for instance, imposes harsh 
penalties on unlawful migrants, whom authorities can detain for up to six months, and those 
who house unlawful migrants, who can face up to three years in prison. Italy’s Immigrants 
Despair at New Laws, BBC NEWS (July 27, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 
8170187.stm. Switzerland recently voted on a referendum that would have required 
mandatory expulsion of foreigners convicted of even minor offenses, such as speeding or 
disorderly conduct, although the referendum ultimately failed to pass. A Rare Setback for 
Immigrant-Bashing in Switzerland, ECONOMIST (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.economist. 
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Together with these legal protections for immigrants, regional networks 
form what is essentially the third pillar of the immigration system; 
allocation of visas and enforcement, however imperfect, constitute the other 
two pillars. In the United States, the integration network includes 
community colleges and adult English language instruction, faith-based 
organizations and NGOs, and the family ties that most immigrants have as 
they arrive. Because of this third pillar, according to one study, citizenship 
among a fixed cohort of adult legal immigrants rose from seven percent in 
1990 to fifty-six percent in 2008, and English-language proficiency rose 
from fifty-six percent to sixty-four percent.
68
 
The American experience with immigration also encompasses more 
complicated—and, in some cases, darker—facets, particularly surrounding 
the contentious issue of unlawful migration. Regardless, the legal changes 
wrought in the 1960s have certainly been enormously consequential in 
making America what it is today—a country that accepts a higher number 
of legal immigrants on average than any other country in modern times, that 
boasts the most innovative economy on the planet, and that looks to bring 
talented people into the fold while also striving to unite families and take in 
a measured number of refugees. What was once a process that brought 
outsiders to large, trade-oriented metropolitan areas near the coasts and the 
Great Lakes has now delivered demographic change across the Southeast 
and the Midwest, too.  
Immigration has also given America certain features that many countries 
envy. First, America’s economy is innovative, not only in Silicon Valley 
but in many parts of the country where skilled and entrepreneurial migrants 
promote new ventures. Indeed, immigrant populations have marked effects 
on geographic areas: according to one study, a one percent increase in 
college-educated immigrants is associated with a six percent increase in 
patents per capita,
69
 and immigrant workers often bring distinctive skills 
that create economic benefits for large majorities of the population.
70
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Second, America enjoys relatively high levels of cohesion and societal 
peace for such a diverse society, partly because of family ties and partly 
because of faith-based and adult education institutions like community 
colleges. Third, the United States boasts an engaged labor force bolstered 
by immigration that is not, as in most other industrialized countries, rapidly 
aging and beginning to shrink. This demographic reality allows the 
American economy to avoid—without making assumptions about 
automation that, at best, raise separate legal and policy dilemmas—the kind 
of “population inversion” where a shrinking group of working adults 
supports a growing number of retirees.
71
 As an additional benefit, the 
resulting population has reservoirs of knowledge about almost every corner 
of the world.  
The transition has admittedly also left Americans with persistent legal 
and practical dilemmas. In some parts of the United States, especially rural 
communities and small cities, the presence of immigrants has heightened 
anxiety about globalization; moreover, local organizations have not always 
played the same integration-facilitating role of teaching English and 
promoting cohesion. Nationally, Americans must consider how to adapt 
their system to a world of greater competition for highly knowledgeable 
migrants, addressing an unlawful side of migration that generates tension 
and risks and keeping the concept of citizenship vital and meaningful by 
supporting assimilation—knowledge of a common language, English, and 
belief in our civic institutions and an open society.  
The extent of integration does not mean it has been easy or 
straightforward to forge a dynamic, innovative, and eclectic democracy 
including immigrants in the pluralist milieu. It's worth remembering that the 
national origin quotas largely overcome by the Hart-Celler immigration bill 
had emerged decades earlier in a country keen to exclude immigrants, 
particularly Asians. The prejudice against Asians ran deep.
72
 In 1854, my 
                                                                                                                 
between 30% and 50% of the aggregate productivity growth that took place in the United 
States between 1990 and 2010”). 
 71. See Gerard F. Anderson & Peter Sotir Hussey, Population Aging: A Comparison 
Among Industrialized Countries, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May 2000, at 191, 200-01. 
 72. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(“There is a race so different from our own that we do not permit those belonging to it to 
become citizens . . . I allude to the Chinese race.”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The 
Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 595 (1889) (condoning legislators’ rationales for the 
Chinese Exclusion Act, including “that the presence of Chinese laborers had a baneful 
effect . . . upon public morals; that their immigration was in numbers approaching the 
character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our civilization; [and] that the 
discontent from this cause was not confined to any political party . . . but was well-nigh 
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own court issued a particularly embarrassing decision in People v. Hall, a 
case appealing a murder conviction in which the California Supreme Court 
ruled that Chinese-Americans and immigrants had no right to even testify 
against citizens.
73
 California’s Alien Land Law, passed in 1913, restricted 
any ownership of real property by “aliens ineligible to citizenship.”74 State 
Attorney General Ulysses S. Webb explained that the restriction, although it 
did not specifically name an immigrant group, targeted Japanese 
immigrants based on concern for their “race undesirability.”75  
Over the decades, as immigration enforcement has become a subject of 
greater public discussion, it’s likely that neither policymakers nor the larger 
public fully appreciate the intricate mechanics of integration.
76
 In particular, 
they may not appreciate how those dynamics likely connect the capacity of 
countries to attract talented immigrants who become scientists and 
entrepreneurs with a country’s treatment of working-class immigrants who 
may have arrived through family-based or refugee admissions—or perhaps 
even without documents.
77
 Either at the national or regional level, societies 
that prioritize discretionary enforcement against migrants may encounter 
not only the financial costs of enforcement, but also the difficulties 
associated with erroneous targeting of lawful immigrants and citizens and 
disrupted families and communities.
78
 
                                                                                                                 
universal”); In re Tetsubumi Tano’s Estate, 206 P. 995, 1001 (Cal. 1922) (admitting that the 
Alien Land Law was framed so as “to discourage the coming of Japanese into [California]” 
and noting that this purpose “may be a proper one, and . . . even desirable”). 
 73. 4 Cal. 399, 405 (1854). 
 74. Alien Land Law of 1913, 1913 Cal. Stat. 206; see also Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 
334 (1923) (upholding California’s Alien Land Law). 
 75. RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN 
AMERICANS 204 (2d ed. 1998). 
 76. For example, immigrant integration “has unfolded almost entirely without the help of 
policy intervention.” Tomás R. Jiménez, Immigrants in the United States: How Well Are They 
Integrating into Society?, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 1 (2011), http://www.migra 
tionpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/integration-Jimenez.pdf. Immigrants, with the 
exception of refugees, have received relatively little federal funding for integration programs. 
Id. 
 77. See id. at 19 (noting that while the United States’ laissez faire approach to achieving 
integration has generally worked, “its functionality may be threatened by the precarious state 
of public education [and] immigration policies that leave far too many in an unauthorized 
status”). 
 78. See Demetrios G. Papademetriou & Madeleine Sumption, , Attracting and Selecting 
from the Global Talent Pool: Policy Challenges, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 5–8 (Sept. 2013), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/GlobalTalent-Selection.pdf (discussing how 
immigrants chose a destination and how the rules and regulations of the immigration system 
play a distinctive role); see also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 408 (2012) 
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In recent years, the American system for choosing immigrants has been 
less arbitrary in some ways, giving more weight to family ties and 
economic factors. Though even as unlawful migration has declined,
79
 it 
remains a subject of public concern and threatens to engender further cycles 
of arbitrary enforcement and restriction. In even more recent days, the 
questions that arise are about the viability of the United States’ status as an 
immigration “superpower” in light of potentially growing interest in 
restricting legal immigration.
80
 I suspect these restrictionist impulses will be 
tamed somewhat by economic concerns and the difficulty of enacting major 
legislative changes, but the possibility for change is greater now than at any 
point in the last few decades.
81
 Yet, caught somewhere between principles 
and policy in the 1960s, lawmakers and the president began writing a 
different chapter with its own benefits and burdens—one that says America 
over the decades is able to embrace change while remaining dedicated to 
the ideal that citizenship comes with both rights and responsibilities. 
                                                                                                                 
(“[Arizona’s S. B. 1070] would allow the State to achieve its own immigration policy. The 
result could be unnecessary harassment of some aliens (for instance, a veteran, college 
student, or someone assisting with a criminal investigation) whom federal officials 
determine should not be removed. This is not the system Congress created.”). 
 79. After reaching a peak of 12.2 million in 2007, the number of undocumented 
immigrants in the United States has fallen to an estimated 11 million in 2015. Jens Manuel 
Krogstad et al., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 27, 
2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-
in-the-u-s/. 
 80. Canada, for instance, has recently admitted and invested more in its refugee 
programs on a per capita basis. In 2016, Canada admitted 268 refugees per 100,000 
inhabitants, while the United States admitted 84 refugees per 100,000 inhabitants. UNHCR, 
Global Trends 2016, UNHCR (2016), http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34; see Canada to Let 
300,000 Immigrants Enter Country in 2017, GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/31/canada-immigration-quota-2017 (stating Canada took in 
55,800 refugees in 2016 for a total population of 35 million); Fact Sheet: Fiscal Year 2016 
Refugee Admissions, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.state.gov/j/ 
prm/releases/factsheets/2017/266365.htm (stating that United States admitted 84,995 
refugees in 2016 for a total population of 324.5 million). Canada spent twenty-five dollars 
per capita to support refugee admissions, whereas the United States spent three dollars per 
capita. Benjamin Bathke, How Canada and the U.S. Compare on Syrian Refugees, CBC 
NEWS CANADA (Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.cbc.ca/1.3340852. 
 81. Jordain Carney, GOP Senators Propose Cutting Back on Legal Immigration to US, 
THE HILL (Feb. 7, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/318284-gop-senators-scale-
back-legal-immigration-to-the-us; David Nakamura, After Years on the Outside, Foes of 
Legal Immigration Find a Louder Voice with Trump’s Election, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 
2016), https://wpo.st/1snc2. 
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That ideal is at the core of American achievements in the field of 
immigration. These are borne not of any one policy but of the relative 
balance in the last sixty years between policies and the public's 
understanding of the nation's character as an immigrant nation. This 
American immigration balance allows for some change from one 
generation to the next, and it depends not only on tolerance but on the 
robust interest among immigrants in working—whether in laboratories in 
Silicon Valley or lettuce fields in the Imperial Valley—and, through work, 
assimilating to some degree.  
The balance has made it possible in the last generation for the settlement 
of Asian, Latino, and Middle Eastern immigrants to spread far from 
California and New York and large urban centers like Chicago to smaller 
towns in rural North Carolina and Iowa. American commitments to this 
balance have also likely exerted influence across borders, contributing to 
other countries' willingness to expand legal immigration over the last fifty 
years. But that balance is now under growing pressure from an 
unsympathetic executive branch and the public mood in regions feeling 
economically vulnerable and more anxious about their changing 
demographics. Whether the balance survives for future generations is 
among the most important questions affecting the future of the United 
States. 
III. Choosing Intelligent Futures Intelligently 
Nine years before the Hart-Celler Act passed—almost sixty years ago—
another transition was beginning in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Herbert 
Simon was a star professor at Carnegie Mellon, the son of a German 
immigrant father and a mother who was the daughter of Czech immigrants. 
Walking into his class one day, Simon announced that he and his colleague, 
Al Newell, had built a thinking machine.
82
 This was no chatty, empathetic 
precursor to Siri but a simple expert system capable of generating 
remarkably elegant proofs of Bertrand Russell's Principia Mathematica—
proofs that reportedly made Russell exclaim that it would have been nice to 
know machines could do this before he'd spent ten years on it. Over the rest 
of his career, Simon remained passionately focused on expert systems 
cobbled together with the technology of his day. During the bulk of his 
career, major advances in computing were anchored either at universities or 
private sector corporations dependent on large government (often defense-
                                                                                                                 
 82. HUNTER CROWTHER-HEYCK, HERBERT A. SIMON: THE BOUNDS OF REASON IN 
MODERN AMERICA 225 (2005). 
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related) contracts. Both the technological changes many Americans now 
take for granted and the rising importance of private organizations in 
computing innovations described below might have floored him.  
Because of these changes, people who are adults today are on one side of 
a major generational divide: barring a cataclysm, theirs is the last 
generation that will remember a world where computers were mostly on 
desks and in special rooms, and where most people weren’t walking around 
with little supercomputers in their pockets or on their wrists. That 
generation of adults is also the last one that will remember, even if only 
vaguely, a day-to-day existence before nearly everyone was tethered to a 
global network capable of tracking where a person is and what he or she is 
doing.  
Simon would have almost certainly found it a challenge worthy of his 
talents to craft a model of how the children of the current generation of 
children would navigate the individual and societal tradeoffs associated 
with their world. To do so, Simon—and, indeed, any lawyer, judge, or 
policymaker seeking to envision the tensions all but certain to face 
American law—would need to consider at least four trends prominently 
reflected in society’s reliance on networked information technology and in 
how that technology is changing. To begin, organizations within society are 
improving their capacity to amass and analyze huge amounts of data about 
human behavior—both in real time and over time. In part, the improvement 
is a function of falling prices of storage technology and processing power 
over the last few decades.
83
 Change is underway, too, in the software and 
the statistical techniques we use to analyze data. And we have cheaper and 
more ubiquitous ways to gather data, such as cameras, exercise bands,
84
 
                                                                                                                 
 83. In the three decades between 1980 and 2011, computer storage costs dropped “by a 
factor of ten roughly every four years.” Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications 
Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 391 (2014). For example, in 1984, a single gigabyte of 
data cost $85,000, whereas it cost about five cents in 2011. Id. (citing John Villasenor, 
Recording Everything: Digital Storage as an Enabler of Authoritarian Governments, CTR. 
FOR TECH. INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, 3 (Dec. 14, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/1214_digital_storage_villasenor.pdf). Whether trends in such 
declines will continue unabated, indefinitely is subject to a measure of debate. 
 84. One study comparing fitness tracker privacy and security found that most fitness 
tracking applications included in the study sent fitness and other data to company servers. 
For example, Jawbone “periodically transmits” geolocation information to its servers when 
the application is open. Additionally, many applications sent generated fitness data such as 
“steps taken, stairs climbed, stairs down, calories burned, speed, sleep depth, . . . heart rate, 
and blood pressure.” ANDREW HILTS ET AL., OPEN EFFECT, EVERY STEP YOU FAKE: A 
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GPS, electronic tests, Internet searches, and so on. According to one 
estimate, only about twenty-five percent of the world’s stored information 
was digitized in 2000, whereas almost all of the world’s stored information 
was digitized in 2012.
85
 As of 2008, there were more devices on the Internet 
than people on the planet, and by 2020, an estimated 50 billion devices will 
be connected to the Internet.
86
 The so-called “Internet of Things”87 will not 
only supplement such means to amass data; it implies a particular vision of 
how society might use the networked nature of these sensing technologies, 
allowing for more routine aggregation of such data so that people and 
organizations might better predict when behavior will stay constant and 
when it might change. Accordingly, some observers are inclined to suggest 
that big data will make our world simpler and its complex patterns more 
discernible. 
Finally, prevailing social norms appear to be evolving with regard to 
what major subsets of society expect from computers. In the early twenty-
first century, many members of the public have routinely come to accept 
that an algorithm is recommending not only music selections or movies to 
watch, but also whom to date,
88
 how to invest, and how to persuade 
Americans to enlist in the armed services.
89 
The shift is from a world where 
                                                                                                                 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FITNESS TRACKER PRIVACY AND SECURITY 19-20, 22 (2016), 
https://openeffect.ca/reports/Every_Step_You_Fake.pdf. 
 85. As of 2012, that was about 2.7 zettabytes of digitally stored information. Elizabeth 
E. Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 
39 (2014). 
 86. PRESIDENT’S NAT’L SEC. TELECOMMS. ADVISORY COMM., NSTAC REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT ON THE INTERNET OF THINGS ES-2 (2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/NSTAC%20Report%20to%20the%20President%20on%20the%20Internet%
20of%20Things%20Nov%202014%20(updat%20%20%20.pdf [hereinafter NSTAC REPORT]. 
 87. The “Internet of Things” refers to the “decentralized network” of everyday 
objects—from kitchen appliances to car tires—that are connected to the Internet and can 
process and communicate data about the physical world. See id. at ES-1; Scott R. Peppet, 
Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 676, 699 (2012). 
 88. One study shows that in 2005, “few Americans” had tried online dating, compared 
to fifteen percent of American adults today. Americans also view online dating more 
positively: in 2005, only forty-four percent of American adults indicated that “online dating 
is a good way to meet people,” whereas fifty-nine percent agreed with this statement in 
2015. Aaron Smith & Monica Anderson, 5 Facts About Online Dating, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 
29, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/29/5-facts-about-online-dating/. 
Note that not all dating apps use algorithms in any “smart” way; some may just show people 
in your location without considering whether there are any compatible characteristics. 
 89. For example, the United States Army employs a chatbot, named Sgt. Star, to help 
recruiting efforts and to answer questions online. The chatbot communicates with an average 
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it was nearly quaint to accept that cars will drive themselves to one where it 
seems quite straightforward to imagine that cars will not only choose the 
route but also the destination. “Take me somewhere fun,” one might 
conceivably say. Increasingly, many members of the public would not be 
too surprised if the car responded with a phrase along the following lines: 
“Do you want someplace close to the water, or just a watered-down version 
of the last place I chose for fun?”  
These advances are fathomable because a resurgence of interest has 
emerged in the field of machine learning, both in the academic and 
commercial realms. One can readily observe the increasing interest by 
following the venture capital and private sector funding dollars, where 
yearly disclosed investments in artificial intelligence ventures have grown 
from $282 million in 2011 to $2.388 billion in 2015;
90
 by reading about the 
artificial intelligence research facilities that Baidu, Samsung, Toyota, 
Google, Facebook, and others have built in San Mateo and Santa Clara 
counties; and by talking to scholars who contrast our current times with the 
periodic “artificial intelligence winters” where folks lost interest in the field 
(in the 1980s, for example). Traditional expert systems used law-like 
techniques to search through potential options when analyzing how to 
diagnose certain medical conditions or categorize a particular kind of 
molecule—but they were cumbersome at best when it came to some of the 
seemingly simple tasks that people could do almost “without thinking,” like 
classifying visual objects, interpreting idiomatic expressions, or decoding 
nonverbal communication. As computing power gets cheaper and software 
improves, expert systems are ever more able to sift through millions of 
options quite quickly.  
But an even more substantial change is underway in the realm of so-
called machine learning—the application of statistical and related 
techniques to recognize patterns—in which software architecture leverages 
approaches to pattern recognition that (largely) abandon the search for an 
overarching theory of cognition that so preoccupied Simon in his day. 
Rather than using human-crafted algorithms to map data onto predicted 
outcomes, machine learning techniques use data regarding outcomes to 
                                                                                                                 
of 1550 people each day. Dave Maass, Answers and Questions About Military, Law 
Enforcement, and Intelligence Agency Chatbots, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 18, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/answers-questions-about-military-law-enforcement-
and-intelligence-agency-chatbots.  
 90. Artificial Intelligence Explodes: New Deal Activity Record for AI Startups, CB 
INSIGHTS (June 20, 2016), https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/artificial-intelligence-funding-
trends/. 
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discern the algorithm that best maps data onto desired outcomes. Neural 
networks, inspired by the layout of the human brain, constitute one such 
technique for spotting patterns in large aggregations of data. “Deep 
learning” systems, a particular architecture for neural networks, avoid some 
persistent problems neural networks have had in developing adaptive 
responses to new data, sparking acute interest because of such systems’ 
capacity to solve pattern-recognition problems in computer vision and other 
fields.
91
 Meanwhile, “genetic algorithms,” which emerge by developing 
simple algorithms—baby computer programs—to solve a problem (like 
spotting suspicious financial transactions), allowing those algorithms to 
mutate slightly over time, and then selecting for those algorithms that beat 
the others on a given metric.
92
 “Reinforcement learning models” take a 
similar approach but provide for agents to learn during their lifetimes, 
rather than waiting to see which algorithms “win” or “lose.”93 Both genetic 
algorithms and reinforcement learning explore new paths and exploit the 
information learned thus far.
94
  
In part because of the convergence of these analytical techniques and 
large aggregations of data and computing power, society will see even more 
change in the realm of user interfaces. Built into such interfaces will be 
legally-relevant tradeoffs regarding responsibility for decisions and the 
salience of information presented to users—whether such interfaces are 
visual, as with augmented or virtual reality; use natural language and 
speech recognition, like Siri, Alexa, or Cortana; or leverage new ways of 
integrating computers and the brain. The most significant contribution of 
these technologies is not sophisticated graphics. Instead, it is the prospect of 
machines using neural networks to simulate intelligent conversation without 
ever credibly raising the specter of a major philosophical milestone 
involving genuinely conscious thought by machines. 
The potential applications for some of these artificial intelligence 
technologies—whether genetic algorithms or sophisticated neural nets—can 
help society live up to its ideals involving matters ranging from access to 
justice to education. In some jurisdictions, the ideal of access to justice 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Yann LeCun et al., Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436, 436 (2015). 
 92. See generally MASATOSHI SAKAWA, GENETIC ALGORITHMS AND FUZZY 
MULTIOBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION (2002); Marek Obitko, Genetic Algorithm, INTRODUCTION 
TO GENETIC ALGORITHMS (1998), http://www.obitko.com/tutorials/genetic-algorithms/ga-
basic-description.php. 
 93. Amit Patel, AI Techniques, STANFORD THEORY GROUP, http://theory.stanford.edu/~ 
amitp/GameProgramming/AITechniques.html (last modified July 16, 2017). 
 94. Id. 
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suffers from a lack of sufficient interpreters or lawyers to help the indigent. 
In the context of environmental law, agency officials may find it daunting 
to identify the correct molecules to regulate. In both policing and military 
contexts, the decision to use force is fraught and complex. I see potential in 
expert systems, combined with natural language user interfaces, to help 
with interpreting, to facilitate legal advice,
95
 and to enhance the capacity of 
agencies to discern what they should regulate. I see machine learning tools 
and algorithms working through data from military or police body cameras 
in real time, maybe helping us make smarter decisions about when to use 
force.  
Important though these opportunities are, they also raise profound 
questions about the allocation of power and responsibility in society. The 
questions reflect the scale of the transition currently underway not only in 
the institutional infrastructure and legal arrangements supporting 
innovations in artificial intelligence, but also in the dilemmas lawyers and 
policy makers face as they adapt legal doctrines to a world of greater 
reliance on software to make key organizational decisions. To begin, 
society lacks precise, incontrovertible formulas to answer the question of 
what government should maximize. More generally, even societies with 
common cultural norms often lack consensus about how best to define 
individual rationality (especially across time) and aggregate social welfare. 
This is one reason why states differ in their treatment of concepts such as 
reasonableness and duress, and why even relatively clear statutes applied to 
new situations engender sharp disagreements. Given these continuing 
questions about what constitutes reasoned human decision-making, 
translating powerful, complex ideas into the language of algorithms and 
machine learning protocols is the mother of all statutory drafting and 
interpretation problems. 
Second, each decision to trust an automated system—especially one 
relying on artificial intelligence technology—becomes another reason for 
concern about cybersecurity. In October 2016, attackers reportedly relied 
on “hundreds of thousands of internet-connected devices like cameras, baby 
monitors and home routers” to conduct a cyberattack against Dyn, a 
                                                                                                                 
 95. For example, ROSS Intelligence is a legal research tool that responds to questions you 
would ask humans rather than keyword searches. ROSS was designed to reduce the cost of 
legal research. Anthony Sills, ROSS and Watson Tackle the Law, IBM (Jan. 14, 2016), https:// 
www.ibm.com/blogs/watson/2016/01/ross-and-watson-tackle-the-law/. More information 
about ROSS is available at ROSS, http://www.rossintelligence.com/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2017). 
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Domain Name System provider.
96
 As a result, people across the United 
States temporarily had difficulty accessing several major websites, 
including Twitter, Netflix, Reddit, and The New York Times.
97
  
For our purposes, three features of society’s prevailing technological 
infrastructure in the early twenty-first century help place in context the 
economic and governance tradeoffs associated with the growing reliance on 
sophisticated, networked computers to make important personal or societal 
decisions: (1) the Internet in its current, distributed-architecture form is the 
backbone of the emerging world of machine learning; (2) the Internet was 
designed to be adaptable and relatively resilient rather than secure; and (3) 
societies are moving towards a world where Internet-connected computers 
have considerably greater control over infrastructure and human 
decisions.
98
 The best-case scenario is an arms race between artificially 
intelligent security technologies and artificially intelligent intrusion 
technologies.
99
 But if our nation does not soon address the cybersecurity 
risks that allowed for an attack like the one against Dyn, we could see far 
more intrusive attacks, affecting ever larger majorities of the population, in 
the near future.  
Indeed, in November 2014, an advisory committee to the President 
responsible for crafting a report on the Internet of Things reached a stark 
conclusion. “The Nation,” wrote the authors, “now stands on the edge of 
a . . . revolution in how it interacts with devices and how they will serve us; 
however, if security is not included as a core consideration, there are very 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites Across 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/business/internet-
problems-attack.html. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Stuxnet, the world’s first digital weapon, underscores the risks of an increasingly 
interconnected world. KIM ZETTER, COUNTDOWN TO ZERO DAY: STUXNET AND THE LAUNCH 
OF THE WORLD’S FIRST DIGITAL WEAPON 5–18 (2014). Discovered in 2010, Stuxnet was a 
malicious computer worm spread via inflected USB flash drives that manipulated the 
computer systems that controlled and monitored the speed of the centrifuges in Iran’s 
nuclear program. Id. Commenting on its implications, Zetter described Stuxnet as a 
“remarkable achievement, given its sophistication and single-minded focus,” but “it altered 
the landscape for all cyberattacks, opening the door to a new generation of assaults from 
state and non-state actors that have the potential to cause physical damage and even loss of 
life in ways never before demonstrated.” Id. at 374–75. 
 99. More than a dozen countries, including China, Russia, Iran, the United Kingdom, 
Israel, France, Germany, and North Korea, have digital warfare programs or have announced 
plans to build one. Id. at 373. In the United States, the Defense Department’s Cyber 
Command has an annual budget of more than $3 billion and plans to increase its workforce 
five-fold, from 900 people to 4900. Id. 
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real consequences . . . .”100 The report noted that the “next two to five years 
is the opportunity to get this right.”101 Even leaving aside the further 
security implications of the so-called Internet of Things, organizations at 
key junctures in the modern networked economy are vulnerable to major 
data breaches and integrity problems. A recent data breach at a credit 
reporting agency is estimated to have affected over 140 million Americans, 
and Facebook reportedly appears to have been easily tricked into selling 
advertisements to Russia-linked fake accounts that were used to seek 
further polarization on divisive issues such as immigration.
102
 These trends 
underscore how Americans are embracing a world of greater reliance on 
networked computing infrastructures and artificial intelligence while 
security is an unsolved problem, making people vulnerable to subtle 
manipulation and organizations as well as countries vulnerable to attack. 
And at present, there is no compelling reason to assume—as a matter of 
economics, societal norms, or regulation—that society will achieve a 
particularly efficient or attractive outcome in the balance we implicitly 
strike between reluctance to rely on artificially intelligent machines and 
concerns about whether they will function with integrity. 
Third, heavy reliance on computer programs—particularly, adaptive ones 
that modify themselves over time rather than the expert systems with which 
Simon primarily concerned himself—may further complicate public 
deliberation about administrative decisions. The problem arises because 
few, if any, observers will be entirely capable of understanding how a given 
decision was reached. In some ways, these are really subsets of a larger 
point, which is that we don't have a great legal framework to manage 
principal-agent problems or to resolve disputes between people and very 
complex, self-modifying machines. Agencies have long relied on software 
to analyze data and inform assessments of the costs and benefits of 
                                                                                                                 
 100. NSTAC REPORT, supra note 86, at 23-24. 
 101. Id. at 24. 
 102. Tara Siegel Bernard & Stacy Cowley, Equifax Hack Exposes Regulatory Gaps, 
Leaving Consumers Vulnerable, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017 
/09/08/business/equifax.html. Scott Shane & Vindy Goel, Fake Russian Facebook Accounts 
Bought $100,000 in Political Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.ny 
times.com/2017/09/06/technology/facebook-russian-political-ads.html. Further refinements 
in machine learning techniques will almost certainly play a role in limiting such 
vulnerabilities in the future, and use of such software may become an important feature in 
standards of reasonable care developed in the context of tort law. But related techniques will 
also likely be deployed to thwart security measures, and the expected continued reliance on 
the Internet itself will mean reliance on an infrastructure designed to be open rather than 
secure. 
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particular actions.
103
 What’s different is how the scope of reliance on 
software may be expanding to encompass new kinds of functions—such as 
policing decisions, using tools like COMPAS to assess the risk of 
recidivism at sentencing
104
 or PredPol to predict the locations of future 
crimes
105—and activities that had previously been treated primarily as 
within the domain of human judgment. In the military context, The New 
York Times reported that “the Pentagon has put artificial intelligence at the 
center of its strategy . . . spending billions of dollars to develop . . . 
autonomous and semiautonomous weapons.”106 
Fourth, current legal arrangements are rarely especially well-suited or 
carefully crafted to police the balance of decision-making responsibility 
between humans and computer systems in situations where we want a 
human in the loop. Consider as an example how courts, at least when 
policing public sector decision-making, tend to rely on presumptions of 
regularity to avoid awkward questions about whether an official legally 
responsible for making a decision has actually made that decision rather 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Cyberdelegation and the Administrative State 9–15 
(Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 2754385, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Deli 
very.cfm?abstractid=2754385. 
 104. See State v. Loomis, 2016 WI 68, ¶ 120, 371 Wis.2d 235, 282, 881 N.W.2d 749 
(finding that court’s reliance on a Correctional Offender Management Profiling for 
Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) risk assessment, a trade-secret protected algorithm used to 
advise sentencing decisions, did not violate due process). 
 105. The policing tool PredPol—which was reportedly used in almost sixty police 
departments across the country as of 2015—uses machine learning to try to predict the 
locations of future crimes, including locations other than those of past crimes. Ellen Huet, 
Server and Protect: Predictive Policing Firm PredPol Promises to Map Crime Before It 
Happens, FORBES (Feb. 11, 2015; 6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/ 
02/11/predpol-predictive-policing/#541ff6b84f9b. 
 106. Matthew Rosenberg & John Markoff, The Pentagon’s ‘Terminator Conundrum’: 
Robots That Could Kill on Their Own, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/10/26/us/pentagon-artificial-intelligence-terminator.html?_r=0. A 2009 United States 
Air Force report acknowledged the possibility that advances in technology could create 
autonomous machines, and stated that ethical and policy discussions are needed to figure out 
how to use that technology. The report states, “Authorizing a machine to make lethal combat 
decisions is contingent upon political and military leaders resolving legal and ethical 
questions.” U.S. AIR FORCE, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS FLIGHT PLAN 2009-2047, at 41 
(2009), https://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas_2009.pdf; see also Peter Finn, A Future for 
Drones: Automated Killing, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
national/national-security/a-future-for-drones-automated-killing/2011/09/15/gIQAVy9mgK_ 
story.html.  
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than relying on advisers.
107
 Not only does litigation-related discovery have 
its costs, but it’s also substantively difficult to draw a line between laudable 
reliance on other minds to supplement a decision-maker’s judgment and 
inappropriately allowing someone else to decide. It’s far from obvious that 
these problems would be easier to handle when the line must be drawn 
between the computer as a mere decision-support tool and the human as the 
implementer of machine-mediated decision. 
And in some settings, such as those raising tort law questions, existing 
law may encourage automation without necessarily reflecting a careful 
weighing of aggregate risks or consequences.
108
 We are then faced with an 
exceedingly blurry line between computer-assisted human choice and 
human-ratified computer choice. We can begin to see the complexity of this 
question by looking to older cases examining liability for both excessive 
reliance and insufficient reliance on computing systems.  
Consider an example. In 1986, the Supreme Court of Georgia found that 
it was a question for the jury “whether the plaintiff was negligent in relying 
solely upon its computer, considering the current widespread use of 
computers for the purpose of keeping business records, and that the 
plaintiff’s computer . . . may not have been known to be inaccurate.”109 In 
contrast, in 1983 the Court of Appeals of Arizona found the defendant 
trucking company liable for a wrongful death because the company could 
have quickly set up a computer program to verify driver log books (and 
better regulate driver fatigue) rather than accepting inaccurate log books.
110
 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (applying a 
presumption of regularity to criminal defendants’ selective-prosecution claim); United States 
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (applying a presumption of regularity to Secretary of 
Agriculture’s decision); United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926) 
(applying a presumption of regularity to public official charged with authority under Trading 
with the Enemy Act); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. FDA, 491 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 
1974) (applying presumption of regularity to FDA’s decision). 
 108. The Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), could 
provide one way of looking at new technologies. The Court determined that police use of a 
thermal imaging device to take a thermal image of the defendant’s home (from outside the 
home) was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, in part because of 
the “sense-enhancing technology” used by the police. Id. at 34. Moreover, in a concurring 
opinion in United States v. Jones, 65 U.S. 400 (2012), Justice Sotomayor acknowledged how 
technology may impact our understanding of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” (one 
possible component in the determination of whether an unreasonable search occurred), 
noting that “even short-term [GPS] monitoring . . . will require particular attention.” Id. at 
415. 
 109. 49 AM. JUR. TRIALS 281 § 2, n.31 (Oct. 2017 update). 
 110. Id. § 6. 
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Finally, as the American model for sophisticated development of 
information technology transitions from one driven heavily by government 
contracts to one spurred by commercial advantage, the labor and 
employment consequences of “artificial intelligence”—like those in the past 
associated with trade policy and immigration—will almost certainly prove 
enormously contentious.
111
 Arguments over labor and law in the 1920s 
were as contentious as anything in law and politics in the early twentieth 
century, or the arguments about trade right now. Political schisms over 
disappearing jobs will fuel fights over cybersecurity, human dignity, and 
basic income amidst the possibility that millions of drivers, middle-class 
white-collar workers, and (as advances in robotics accelerate) security 
guards and medical care workers may lose their jobs in the decades to 
come. 
The chapters to come in this story will no doubt incorporate discussion 
of the rate of change in the capacity of particular technologies to transform 
energy into computing power at a given cost,
112
 the knowledge of human 
psychology necessary to transform a particular combination of computing 
power and software into particular experiences for people, and changes in 
software architectures. The story will almost certainly encompass a 
transition in the pivotal areas of law, from elaborate government contracts 
funding research and development, to antitrust and competition laws, 
liability under tort law, willful blindness, and perhaps above all, public and 
private legal arrangements designed to narrow the gap between how 
artificially intelligent systems function when they analyze a problem and 
what individuals and organizations can comprehend. Common to nearly all 
of the law- and policy-related dilemmas is the matter of defining what 
                                                                                                                 
 111. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (striking down New York 
labor law that limited work hours at bakeries), and Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 
525, 562 (1923) (striking down minimum wage for female employees), with Adkins, 261 
U.S. at 562 (Taft, C.J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not the function of this court to hold 
congressional acts invalid simply because they are passed to carry out economic views 
which the court believes to be unwise or unsound.”), and Morehead v. New York ex rel. 
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 633 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) (accusing the majority of relying 
on its “own personal economic predilections” in striking down minimum wage statute). See 
also Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 394-97 (2012) (describing debate and concerns 
underlying federal immigration law); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 
(1993) (denying temporary restraining order to enjoin executive order that directed Coast 
Guard to repatriate individuals on vessels from Haiti without first determining whether they 
were refugees).  
 112. Mitchell M. Waldron, The Chips Are Down on Moore’s Law, 530 NATURE 144 (Feb. 
2016). 
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arbitrariness means in a setting where few participants in decisions—such 
as judges or policymakers, “deep learning” neural networks, the designers 
of those networks, or members of the public—speak a common analytical 
language.  
In effect, Americans and their counterparts are writing statutes, 
regulations and court decisions governing what kind of justification for a 
decision advised by an artificial intelligence application is required. They 
are deciding when manufacturers can market autonomous vehicles without 
steering wheels, how cybersecurity breaches will be controlled, and when 
certain companies have accumulated too much market power. Some of the 
resulting legal arrangements must ultimately confront the irony that 
artificial intelligence tools prove valuable in some cases precisely because 
they identify patterns that would seem arbitrary to many human observers. 
But a closely related concern may be whether the extent of concentrated 
market power and control over data allowing that software to generate such 
insights itself creates the risk of actions that the larger public might 
consider unjustified or even arbitrary. In 1890, roughly the year when my 
account commenced, Americans concerned about the power of economic 
interests over their government enthusiastically turned their attention to 
competition (or, in American terms, antitrust) law. Perhaps attention will 
turn there again in earnest at a time when only a few players may have the 
enormous data needed to pursue elaborate forms of artificial intelligence at 
scale. 
IV. Conclusion 
Each of these transition narratives is written in a somewhat different 
script, featuring a distinctive cast of characters and settings that range from 
Chicago to Pittsburgh to Silicon Valley. Each conveys one portion of a 
larger story about law and development—a story offering insights not only 
about the context for the work of Judith Shklar, Michael Feighan, or 
Herbert Simon, but about how Americans rely on law and institutions in 
responding to an intricate world of risks and possibilities that no single 
institution controls. Channeling labor conflicts into courts and agencies 
brought to the fore not only the importance of separation of powers, but 
also the extra-legal constraints deeply embedded in American society. Our 
shifts on immigration underscored our capacity to integrate immigrants and 
the geopolitical benefits of doing so; they also emphasized the 
consequences of discretionary choices and difficult dilemmas about 
enforcement. Emerging questions about artificial intelligence and the law 
are breathing new relevance into not only the common law but also 
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constitutional and statutory interpretation—making them all more central to 
our relationship to technology.  
But one can also discern some common threads in a larger narrative. 
First, each story relates in some way to society's concern with adapting and 
checking some form of arbitrariness in government amidst a changing 
domestic and international context. Norms emerged against arbitrary 
executive branch decisions about labor or mobilization, and against an 
arbitrarily hard-wired system that sought to retain the national origin 
distribution in the country. The cluster of dilemmas associated with 
artificial intelligence poignantly emphasize how societies keen to preserve 
values like non-arbitrariness must learn and adapt to preserve their capacity 
for deliberation about technologies much of the public only poorly 
understands.  
Second, the United States’ distinctive version of pluralism interacts—in 
the transitions at issue here—with its homegrown variety of federalism. 
Federalism has afforded states the latitude to choose how to navigate 
emerging societal challenges, while also likely fostering various kinds of 
competitive dynamics contributing to gradual changes in norms such as 
those associated with the once-high prevalence of crass corruption. Despite 
pressures to standardize legal and policy arrangements in domains ranging 
from immigrant integration to the regulation of autonomous vehicles, many 
states will almost certainly choose to experiment with different 
arrangements.  
Finally, as the United States became a global power and experienced 
both the Cold War and economic globalization, a process of pluralist 
accommodation built into the American legal system elaborate 
compromises reflecting not only domestic considerations, but geopolitical 
and international economic pressures. Plainly, the juncture between 
domestic concerns and cross-border pressures so critical to shaping many 
legal domains remains a contested space. Policymakers may anticipate 
further pressures to revisit key aspects of the existing institutional order 
amidst growing concerns about economic globalization, migration, and 
technological change. They would be wise to do so. 
Together, such concerns raise a larger question: what are the most 
important values for an advanced democracy that relies on institutions and 
some conception of the rule of law, and how does that society implement 
those values and resolve conflicts among such values in response to a 
changing world around it? The question looms especially large in America 
at a time of unusual division, where past transitions evoke the idea of 
adaptation as a national theme.  
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As Americans reflect on how to respond, they have much to celebrate in 
terms of humanitarian considerations and with respect to the United States 
itself. People around the world have become less hungry, less ignorant, 
healthier, and wealthier in the last century.
113
 The United States overcame 
divisions and built remarkable institutions, from universities to courts 
capable of undertaking adjudication on a massive scale. The bonds forged 
across geography during the Great Depression and World War II (and later 
the Cold War) were a singular part of the American story in the twentieth 
century, as American recruits from the heartland fought alongside soldiers 
from Puerto Rico in the Korean War. Immigration has contributed to the 
country's dynamism and its place in the world. The relations between 
nations enabled by trade, migration, and stable domestic institutions have 
helped lift many hundreds of millions out of poverty.
114
 And the 
supercomputers consumers casually carry in their pocket are a testament to 
how coordinated human action can remake the world and upend—faster 
than predicted—core assumptions of what is even possible.  
Now consider the risks and difficult judgment calls alongside the 
possibilities that children growing up in the first half of the twenty-first 
century are likely to face. To ignore how difficult it is for any society to 
avoid arbitrary actions in the face of such challenges—whether these 
involve coercion, selection of its members, or the embrace of empowered 
machines—is to risk having a single season’s injury become a more chronic 
malady. A malady that weakens institutional compromises is risky not only 
because of traditions that erode, but also because a society's limber capacity 
for adaptation is replaced gradually by aching joints and lumbering motion. 
                                                                                                                 
 113. See, e.g., MATT RIDLEY, THE RATIONAL OPTIMIST: HOW PROSPERITY EVOLVES 12 
(2010). In 2005, compared with 1955, the average human being earned nearly three times as 
much money (corrected for inflation), ate one-third more calories of food, buried one-third 
as many of her children, and could expect to live one-third longer. Id. at 14. 
 114. Per capita income rose by fifty-one percent in constant dollars between 1969 and 
1996. Jack McNeil, Changes in Median Household Income: 1969 to 1996, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, 1, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/p23text.html (last revised Sept. 30, 2011). 
Over the last fifty years, global GDP per capita rose over three-fold. Evan Hillebrand, 
Poverty, Growth and Inequality over the Next 50 Years, in FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS, LOOKING AHEAD IN WORLD FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: PERSPECTIVES TO 
2050, at 159, 161 (Piero Conforti ed., 2011) http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2280e/i2280 
e04.pdf. Global life expectancy rose twenty-one years between 1950 to 2010. Average Life 
Expectancy at Birth, 1950-2050, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://pewrsr.ch/ 
1Hmqv6N; see also WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999: MAKING A 
DIFFERENCE 1-11 (1999), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42167/1/WHR_1999.pdf 
(describing global transformation in human health throughout the twentieth century and the 
precipitous decline in mortality). 
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The current generation of children knows little of aching joints as they 
prepare to join their peers around the world in taking the reins of their 
country. Time has a way of changing even the young. Soon they will be 
forced to reflect on what it means to be ambitious—not only as individuals, 
but as citizens. They will be called on to reflect on the legacy of past 
transitions and what aspects of that legacy—such as fealty to particular 
versions of non-arbitrariness, and to the United States’ long-term 
commitment to global engagement—they prefer to keep. Then these new 
generations will decide what costs they will bear to protect and adapt those 
ideals. The nature of such choices will determine whether the United States 
remains the country described by the British Foreign Office in 1928: twice 
as ambitious as any, and filled with people who understand how right Will 
Rogers was to say that “even when you’re on the right track, you’ll get run 
over if you just sit there.” 
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